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The War On Terrorism
And The Constitution
by Michael I. Meyerson
Discussion of civil liberties during wartime often omit the
fact that there can be no meaningful liberty at all if our
homes and offices are bombed or our loved ones are killed
or injured by acts of terror. The Government must be given the tools necessary to accomplish its vital mission. The
first priority must be to win the war against terrorism. There
are, however, other priorities. The United States, in its just
battle for freedom, must ensure that freedom is preserved
during that battle as well. And achieving both goals is not
always easy.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist is fond of quoting Abraham Lincoln's dismissal of judicial criticism over Lincoln's
unilateral suspension of Habeas Corpus at the beginning
of the Civil War. Chief Justice Roger Taney, riding circuit,
had held the suspension of Habeas Corpus was solely a legislative determination. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144
(D.Md. 1861). Thus, he held, Lincoln's actions were unconstitutional, and the arrests sanctioned by them were illegal.
In ignoring the court's decree, Lincoln declared that the
greater good must be served and that the necessities of war
overrode specific rights:
Must [all law] be allowed to finally fail of execution,
even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the
means necessary to their execution some single law,
made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that practically it relieves more of the guilty than of
the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the
laws but one to go unexecuted and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?
Abraham Lincoln, ''Message to Congress, July 4, 1861 " in
The Official Records of the Ullion alld Confederate Annies, Series
IV, I, 311-321.
The limitation of Lincoln's reasoning, though, is that it
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creates a false dichotomy: The complete destruction of our
system of government which can be prevented if a "single
law" which is made in "extreme tenderness of the citizen's
liberty" and is violated to only a "very limited extent."
In the real world, though, it is not necessarily obvious
that the violation of the single law is either necessary or
helpful in ensuring the nation's security. Also, the doctrine
espoused by Lincoln has no obvious stopping point, no
way to determine how many or how fundamental are the
laws which the Government may violate in the name of
national security.
An important example is the internment of more than
120,000 Japanese-Americans during World War II. The
Supreme Court upheld this action, declaring:
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress that there were
disloyal members of that population, whose number
and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing
that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a
menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken
to guard against it.
Korematsu v. United States,323 U.S. 214,218 (1944).
Many years later, though, it was revealed that this "judgment of military authorities" was quite suspect. The conclusions were largely those of one person, Lieutenant
General John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the
Western Defense Command, who was responsible for
West Coast security. Every entity responsible for advis-
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ing him, the FBI, the FCC, and Naval Intelligence, found that there was no such
threat, and that, in the words of Commander Kenneth D. Ringle, an expert
on Japanese intelligence in the Office of
Naval Intelligence, "the entire 'Japanese
Problem' has been magnified out of its
true proportion, largely because of the
physical characteristics of the people; .. .it is no more serious than the
problems of the German, Italian, and
Communistic portions of the United
States population." Evidence also
emerged that DeWitt's decision was motivated in no small part by racial animus. He was to declare that "racial
affinities are not severed by migration,"
and in an off-the-record interview, "[AJ
Jap is a Jap." Hohri v. United States, 586
F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984).
One lesson of history is that the mere
declaration of military necessity does not
necessarily justify the infringement of civil
liberties. Justice Robert Jackson warned
that great skepticism was required when
Government utilized its so-called "war

power" to justify actions:
It usually is invoked in haste and excitement when calm legislative consideration
of
constitutional
limitation is difficult. It is executed
in a time of patriotic fervor that
makes mooeration unpopular. And,
worst of all, it is interpreted by
judges under the influence of the
same passions and pressures. Always ... the Government urges hasty
decision to forestall some emergency or serve some purpose and
pleads that paralysis will result if its
claims to power are denied or their
confirmation delayed.
Particularly when the war power is
invoked to do things to the liberties
of people, or to their property or
economy that only indirectly affect
conduct of the war and do not relate
to the management of the war itself,
the constitutional basis should be
scrutinized with care.
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138,
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146-47 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Are We Really At War?
It is sometimes very easy to tell when
this nation is at war. The day after Pearl
Harbor was bombed, for example, Congress passed a joint resolution stating,
'''That the state of war between the United
States and the Imperial Government of
Japan which has thus been thrust upon
the United States is hereby formally declared ... " However, such formal declarations are rare in American history. The
only others occurred during the War of
1812, the Mexican-American War (1848),
the Spanish-American War (1898), and
World War I.
Most of the more than 100 military actions undertaken by the United States
during the course of our history lacked
such a declaration. They have been accompanied either by Congressional authorization for the use of force without a
formal declaration (as with Desert Storm
and, perhaps, the Vietnam War); Congressional funding without actual authorization (such as the Korean War); or
Congressional silence (as with the invasion of Grenada in 1983).
Knowing whether we are currently "at
war" and against whom, is important for
not only determining the legality of the
military operations but also the consequential changes in legal rights and responsibilities that follow when our nation
is at war.
Before analyzing the current situation, it is useful to recall that, while the
Constitution provides that the President
is "Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States," (Art. II,
Sec. 2), it is Congress which has the
power "to declare war." (Art. I, Sec. 8).
To the framers, this was a vitally important distinction. During the debates
at the Constitutional Convention, James
Madison proposed the final language,
changing the original draft which would
have authorized Congress to "make
war." The purpose of the change was
"leaving to the Executive the power to
repel sudden attacks." As Roger Sherman of Connecticut stated, "The Executive should be able to repel and not to
commence war."
Thus, it is the task of the President to
act, unilaterally if necessary, to oppose
"sudden attacks," but otherwise the deNovember/December 2002 • VoIume)()ON Number 6
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cision to begin a war rests with Congress. The reason for this was the
framers' well-founded distrust of mbn, archs and other leaders who carry their
people into unwise conflict. As James
Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson,
"The constitution supposes, what the
History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch
of power most interested in war, & most
prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in
the Legislature."
The exclusive power of Congress to
"commence" war may not be implicated, however, when others have already
declared war on the United States. At
the birth of our Republic, the Barbary pirates attacked the ships of nations which
did not pay protection money, known
then as "tribute." After Thomas Jefferson became President in 1801, he
stopped such payments, and the ruler
of Tripoli (the "dey") declared war on
the United States. Jefferson sent war
ships to the Mediterranean, which were
then attacked by a Tripolitan ship. After
the American frigates prevailed in battle, the enemy ship was disarmed and
released. Jefferson explained to Congress
that the reason the ship was not captured
was that, since Congress had not declared war, the rules of war permitting
such capture did not apply. (Thomas Jefferson: First Annual Message to Congress, December 8,1801)
Alexander Hamilton mocked Jefferson's highly fonna listic analysis as an "absurdity" which was "so repugnant to
good sense, so inconsistent with national safety ... " (Alexander Hamilton, The
Examination, no. 1, Dec. 17, 1801). Hamilton argued that the Congressional power to declare war meant that, when our
nation was at peace, only Congress could
change it to a state of war. But, he stated,
"when a foreign nation declares, or openly and avowedly makes war upon the
United States, they are then by the very
fact, already at war, and any declaration
on the part of Congress is nugatory: it is
at least unnecessary."
Under Hamilton's analysis, it could
well be argued that no declaration of
war was necessary at all after September 11 to combat the terrorists who
planned and launched the attack. As if
this attack were not sufficient by itself
MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL

to initiate a state of war, Osama bin Landen had previously declared war
against the United States; in 1998, he
called for the killing of American civilians as well as soldiers, "in any country
in which it is possible to do it."
One puzzling aspect is that the War on
Terrorism is not waged against a particular nation. Nonetheless, it is certainly
possible to be in a state of war that is not
so directed. As the Supreme Court held
in finding that the country was in a state
of war during the Civil War, "it is not necessary to constitute war, that both parties
should be acknowledged as independent
nations or sovereign States." The Brig Amy
Warwick [The Prize Cases], 67 U.s. 635
(1862). Thus, the Congressional authorization of force was arguably not necessary to create a state of war between the
United States and those behind
September 11. What is noteworthy about
that authorization, though, is that it may
be read as a specific limitation on the President's authority.
On September 15, 2001, Congress approved a joint resolution which declared,
That the president is authorized to use
all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on Sept. 11,2001,
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons. Authorization for Use
of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 11
Stat. 224 (2001).
Even though this does not contain a
formal declaration of war, it certainly
should be seen as resolving any lingering doubt about military action against
those who planned, carried out, or harbored those involved in September 11.
What is significant is that this authorization is explicitly not a blank check
for a generalized "war on terrorism."
According to The Baltimore Sun, Congress rejected White House language
which would have permitted the president to initiate military action against
terrorists not linked to the attacks of September 11. (Karen Hosler, "Congress endorses the use of force," Baltimore Sun
September 15, 2001, at lA) The plain language of the resolution confirms the

statement of Senator John Kerry (DMass.) that while the resolution gave the
President broad authority to retaliate
against those associated with September 11, it did withhold authorization for
a military attack on "any self-defined terrorist group that you simply don't want
to see around anymore."
Accordingly, the attack on the Taliban
in Afghanistan was a military action undertaken pursuant both to Congressional
authorization, and the inherent powers
of the President as Commander-in-Chief
to respond to a state of war declared by
an adversary. By contrast, unless new information surfaces linking Iraq to September 11, the much-discussed invasion
of Iraq would not appear authorized. Initiating a preemptive strike would seem
to be just the sort of action to "commence"
a conflict which the framers entrusted
only to Congress.
Emergency Powers and Civil Liberties
After September 11, the Executive
Branch claimed broad powers for dealing with those it believed either were terrorists or were assisting terrorists. First,
it claimed the right to try non-citizens
before a military tribunal, with rules far
different from normal criminal trials.
Next, it asserted the right to categorize
both citizens and non-citizens as "enemy combatants." The significance of this
label, according to the Government, is
that it permits the Government to hold
even citizens indefinitely without charging them with a crime and without access to a lawyer.
The military has used special tribunals
since the Revolutionary War. Major John
Andre, Adjutant-General to the British
Army, and co-conspirator with Benedict
Arnold, was tried by a "Board of General
Officers" appointed by General Washington. He was found guilty of spying
and hanged on October 2,1780. The first
fonnal military tribunals were established
by General Winfield Scott during the
Mexican-American War in 1848.
The Civil War saw extensive use of
these tribunals, highlighted by two interesting Supreme Court decisions. In the
first, Ex Parte Val/andigham, 68 U.S. 243
(1863), the Court refused to disturb the
conviction of former Ohio congressman
Clement Vallandigham "for having uttered, in a speech at a public meeting, dis19

loyal sentiments and opinions ... " The
Court stated that it had no power to "review or reverse ... the proceedings of a
military commission."
A few years later, the Supreme Court
overturned the death sentence imposed
by a military tribunal against Lamdin P.
Milligan for "conspiracy against the United States," and freed the prisoner. Ex Parte
Milligan,71 U.S. 2 (1866). The Court ruled
that neither the laws of war nor the authority of military tribunals could be "applied to citizens in states which have
upheld the authority of the government,
and where the courts are open and their
process unobstructed."
The most relevant cases for the current
situation come from the Second World
War, and show both the strengths and
weaknesses of military tribunals. The first
case, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), involved eight saboteurs, trained at a "sabotage school" near Berlin. They landed
on the shores of the United States, four in
Florida and four in New York, discarded their uniforms, put on civilian clothes,
and hid their cache of explosives and incendiary devices. They were captured before they could execute their plan to blow
up war industries and war facilities.
President Roosevelt appointed a Military Commission and directed it to try
the eight saboteurs for offenses against
the law of war (Order of July 2, 1942, 7
Fed. Reg. 5103 (1942». The Court upheld
the use of the military tribunals. First,
the Court said that it was appropriate to
term the saboteurs "unlawful combatants": "[T]hose who during time of war
pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission
of hostile acts involving destruction of
life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such
by military commission."
Next, the Court stated that the fact that
one of the saboteurs may have been a
U.S. citizen was irrelevant: "Citizens
who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and
with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are
enemy belligerents ... "
Two of the saboteurs who cooperated
were sentenced to jail. The other six were
executed three days after the Tribunal an20

nounced its sentence.
Considering the nature of the offense
and the status of the war in 1942, the outcome of Quirin seems reasonable. By contrast, another tribunal case, In re
Yamashita, 327 U.s. 1 (1946), shows the
perils of such tribunals.
Tomoyuki Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese Army
in the Philippines. After surrendering
to the Americans, he was charged with
violating the laws of war by permitting
his soldiers to commit atrocities against
the civilian population. He was convicted by a military tribunal and sentenced to death.
Although the Supreme Court upheld
the tribunal, two Justices, Frank Murphy
and Wiley B. Rutledge, delivered
poignant dissents which reveal the dangers of tribunals. They made the following observations:
1) The charge against Yamashita
was improper. He was charged with
failure to control his troops, but such
control was made impossible by the
American attack of the Philippines:
"To use the very inefficiency and disorganization created by the victorious
forces as the primary basis for condemning officers of the defeated
armies bears no resemblance to justice
or to military reality."
2) He was given inadequate time to
prepare. On the day of arraignment,
October 8, three weeks before the trial
began, petitioner was served with a bill
of particulars specifying 64 items setting forth a vast number of atrocities
and crimes allegedly committed by
troops under his command. Three days
before trial, on October 26, the prosecution filed a supplemental bill of particulars, containing
59 more
specifications. The tribunal denied repeated defense requests for a continuance, even though the attorneys [all
military personnel] had been "working
day and night," with "no time whatsoever to prepare any affirmative defense," as they had been fully occupied
trying "to keep up with that new Bill
of Particulars."
3) The rules of evidence violated all
principles of fundamental fairness.
The only evidence the tribunal heard
concerning Yamashita's knowledge

of the atrocities was in the form of ex
parte affidavits and depositions. He
was never given the opportunity to 4
cross-examine any witness on this
crucial issue.
The tribunal was permitted to admit
any evidence "as in its opinion would
be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge ... [or] would have probative value in the mind of a reasonable
man." The tribunal was also free to determine what weight to give any of the
evidence received without restraint.
What followed was a cascade of hearsay,
second and third-hand reports, and even
an army "propaganda film." In the
words of Justice Rutledge, "[P]etitioner
has been convicted of a crime in which
knowledge is an essential element, with
no proof of knowledge other than what
would be inadmissible in any other capital case or proceeding under our system, civil or military ... "
There are several important lessons for
our current situations. First, military tribunals come with a price in terms of reliability and fairness. Especially when
our civil and criminal courts are functioning, we should be reluctant to relinquish the protections of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment. After all, the Government was able to conduct trials of
both Timothy McVeigh and the terrorists who, in 1993, detonated a bomb in
the World Trade Center.
Second, it is indisputable that the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
Government claims as to who is a combatant properly subject to military tribunals. In arguing that Yaser Esam
Hamdi (a U.s. citizen who was found
among captured Taliban prisoners held
at the Guantanamo Bay) should not be
permitted to see a lawyer, the Government made the extraordinary claim that
the court was not empowered to review
at all the Government's designation of
an American citizen as an enemy combatant: "Given the constitutionally limited role of the courts in reviewing
military decisions, courts may not second-guess the military's determination
that an individual is an enemy combatant and should be detained as such."
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, _ F.3d _ (4th Cir.
July 12, 2002).
Similar claims repeatedly have been
November/December 2002 • Volume 'XXXV Number 6

rejected by the Court. While granting
great deference to the President, the
Supreme Court in Quirin declared,
"[N]either the [President's] Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy
aliens forecloses consideration by the
courts of petitioners' contentions that
the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted
forbid their trial by military commission." As Justice Murphy observed in
Yamashita, the Court assumed jurisdiction to hear the claim: "Thus the obnoxious doctrine asserted by the
Government in this case, to the effect
that restraints of liberty resulting from
military trials of war criminals are political matters completely outside the
arena of judicial review, has been
rejected fully and unquestionably."
Concluding Thoughts
Chief Justice William Rehnquist has
apparently adopted much of the wartime philosophy of Abraham Lincoln. In
fact, he chose Lincoln's phrase "All the
Laws but One," as the title for his book
on civil liberties during times of war. In
a recent speech, Rehnquist reviewed cases from both the Civil War and World
War II and noted that in both conflicts,
"The courts, for their part, have largely
reserved the decisions favoring civil liberties in wartime to be handed down after the war was over." To lawyers and
judges, this may seem a thoroughly undesirable state of affairs, but in the greater
scheme of things it may be best for all concerned." Remarks of Supreme Court Chief
Justice William A. Rehnquist, Director's Forum, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, November 17, 1999.
Cases such as Ex Parte Vallandigham
and Korematsu v. United States occurred
during war-time. Meanwhile, cases such
as Ex Parte Milligan (holding that the military cannot substitute its tribunals for
civil courts which are able to function)
and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304
(1946) (same), occurred after the end of
the conflict.
The Chief Justice may be overlooking
a more recent trend, which indicates that
war-time courts may no longer be as deferential or intimidated, depending on
one's point of view. During the Korean
War, the Supreme Court struck down
MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL

President Truman's attempt to take over
the steel mills. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Similarly, during the Vietnam War, the Court
rejected an attempt by President Nixon
to suppress publication of a classified
study of that war [the Pentagon Papers],
despite the Government's claim that release of the papers posed a grave and immediate danger to the security of the
United States. New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
One of the most interesting things to
note about both those cases is that they
reveal that claims of emergency cannot
always be taken at face value. For example, President Truman had announced
that, "any stoppage of steel production
would immediately place the Nation in
peril." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343
U.s. at _ ( Vinson, c.J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, despite the steelworkers going on strike for fifty-three days following the Court's ruling, there was no steel
shortage or harm to the war effort. See
generally M. Marcus, Truman and the Steel
Seizure Case (1977).
Similarly, the Government declared
that publication of the Pentagon Papers
would create a "grave and immediate
danger to the security of the United
States." Brief for the United States, in New
Yark Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971), at 7. Again, history does not reveal
that any danger resulted other than the
"embarrassment" of the Government predicted by Justice Douglas (''The dominant
purpose of the First Amendment was to
prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing
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information." New York Times Co.,403 U.S.
at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring».
We, as lawyers and as citizens, need to
maintain a difficult balance between patriotism and skepticism. The horrors of
September 11 must never be repeated,
and it falls to the Federal Government in
general and the President, in particular,
to accomplish this formidable task.
At the same time, we must ensure that
our democratic system of government is
protected. Justice Felix Frankfurter stated
that it was"absurd" to worry that Harry
Truman, that "representative product of
the sturdy democratic traditions of the
Mississippi Valley," would become a dictator. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343
U.s. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Nonetheless, Frankfurter warned, "The
accretion of dangerous power does not
come in a day. It does come, however
slowly, from the generative force of
unchecked disregard of the restrictions
that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority."
There is one final peril of which we
must be aware. It almost seems unfair
that we confront those who killed thousands of innocent civilians, who rejoice
at destruction and heartache, while we
attempt to follow the commands of our
own Constitution. Nevertheless, as Justice Frank Murphy wrote in 1946, the brutality and ruthlessness of those we oppose
cannot, "justify the abandonment of our
devotion to justice ... To conclude otherwise is to admit that the enemy has lost
the battle but has destroyed our ideals."
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). to
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